Download (Bloomsbury Companions) Neil A. Manson, Robert W. Barnard (eds.)-The Continuum Companion to Metaphysics-Bloomsbury Academic (2012).pdf PDF

Title(Bloomsbury Companions) Neil A. Manson, Robert W. Barnard (eds.)-The Continuum Companion to Metaphysics-Bloomsbury Academic (2012).pdf
TagsMetaphysics Mind Causality Free Will Naturalism (Philosophy)
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Document Text Contents
Page 353

The Continuum Companion to Metaphysics

168

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Fine, K. (2003), “The non-identity of a material thing and its mater.” Mind , 112,
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Gallois, A. (1998), Occasions of Identity . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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—(1980), Naming and Necessity . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
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Olson, E. (1995), “Why I have no hands.” Theoria , 61, 182–97.
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—(2006), “The paradox of increase.” The Monist , 89, 390–417.
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