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Table of Contents
                            Contents
List of Contributors
Preface
Methods and Methodologies: An Introduction
Part One Methods
	The ‘Ontologization’ of Logic. Metaphysical Themes in
Avicenna’s Reworking of the Organon
	Averroes and the Logical Status of Metaphysics
	Non Est Natura Sine Persona. The Issue of Uninstantiated
Universals from Late Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages
	What Counted as Logic in the Thirteenth Century?
	Two Summulae, Two Ways of Doing Logic: Peter of Spain’s ‘Realism’ and John Buridan’s ‘Nominalism’
	The Scope of Logic: Soto and Fonseca on Dialectic and
Informal Arguments
Part Two Methodologies
	Interpreting Medieval Logic and in Medieval Logic
	Is There a Medieval Mereology?
	On Formalizing the Logics of the Past
	De Interpretatione 5–8: Aristotle, Boethius, and Abaelard on
Propositionality
Bibliography
INDEXES
                        
Document Text Contents
Page 2

Methods and Methodologies

Page 132

two summulae, two ways of doing logic 113

an enuntiabile (nearly all 12th and 13th century authors), a dictum
(Peter Abelard and others), a complexe signi cabile (most famously
Gregory of Rimini and Adam Wodeham) a real proposition (Walter
Burley), or even in modern times a fact or more commonly a state of
a�airs. For the nominalist, by contrast, propositions signify nothing
other than what their terms signify, but di�erently: not simply, but in
a complex manner.

Peter of Spain’s Realism

After this, no matter how sketchy, survey of ‘extremely extreme real-
ism’, as a mere theoretical alternative, we may have a better chance of
‘gauging’ Peter of Spain’s actual realism. As should be clear from this
survey, one really does not have to be a nominalist to be relatively far
removed from this ‘extremely extreme realism’. For instance, an ‘ordi-
nary moderate realist’ such as Aquinas, would certainly disagree with
the extreme realist on the difference between the signification of sin-
gular and universal terms; in fact, Aquinas insists in many places that
accounting for the universality of our universal terms on the basis of
the universality of the things they signify is the Platonic error of con-
fusing modi signi candi and modi essendi. Thus, in his own account,
Aquinas ‘adverbializes’ the relevant semantic relation, pretty much like
a nominalist would, by saying that a universal term is universal not
because it signifies a universal thing, for there is no such a thing, but
because it signifies things in a universal manner.4

4 ‘. . . nunc sermo est de vocibus significativis ex institutione humana; et ideo oportet
passiones animae hic intelligere intellectus conceptiones, quas nomina et verba et ora-
tiones significant immediate, secundum sententiam Aristotelis. Non enim potest esse
quod significent immediate ipsas res, ut ex ipso modo signi candi apparet: significat
enim hoc nomen homo naturam humanam in abstractione a singularibus. Unde non
potest esse quod significet immediate hominem singularem; unde Platonici posuerunt
quod significaret ipsam ideam hominis separatam. Sed quia hoc secundum suam
abstractionem non subsistit realiter secundum sententiam Aristotelis, sed est in solo
intellectu; ideo necesse fuit Aristoteli dicere quod voces significant intellectus concep-
tiones immediate et eis mediantibus res.’ Commentary on De interpretatione 1, l. 2,
n. 5. Cf. ‘. . . dico quod ea quae pertinent ad rationem speciei cuiuslibet rei materialis,
puta lapidis aut hominis aut equi, possunt considerari sine principiis individualibus,
quae non sunt de ratione speciei. Et hoc est abstrahere universale a particulari, vel
speciem intelligibilem a phantasmatibus, considerare scilicet naturam speciei absque
consideratione individualium principiorum, quae per phantasmata repraesentantur.
Cum ergo dicitur quod intellectus est falsus qui intelligit rem aliter quam sit, verum
est si ly aliter referatur ad rem intellectam. Tunc enim intellectus est falsus, quando

Page 133

114 gyula klima

By contrast, Peter of Spain seems to be really close to the theoretical
position of the ‘extremely extreme realist’. Indeed, in his description
of signification, he just states flat-out that categorematic terms have to
signify either singular or universal things.5

According to Peter, signification is the conventional representation
of some thing by an utterance. Therefore, only those terms have sig-
nification that signify some thing, i.e., categorematic terms. Indeed,
Peter goes on to argue that since every thing is either particular or
universal, and syncategorematic terms, such as ‘every’, ‘some’, etc., do
not signify either a universal or a particular thing, they do not signify
any thing, and so they do not have signification in this strict sense.6
Nevertheless, as we shall see, this does not mean that these terms are
absolutely meaningless. In fact, Peter will argue that although such
terms do not signify things, they do signify certain modes of the things
signified by categorematic terms. For now, however, we should just
note Peter’s unabashed talk about universal things in this argument.

Peter divides signification into the signification of substantive
things, performed by substantive nouns, and the signification of adjec-
tive things, performed by adjective nouns or verbs. Again, Peter insists
that this distinction does not characterize modes of signi cation, but
modes of things.7

Whatever these things and their modes are, Peter states that it is on
account of the difference between these two types of signification that
we have to distinguish between supposition and copulation.

intelligit rem esse aliter quam sit. Unde falsus esset intellectus, si sic abstraheret spe-
ciem lapidis a materia, ut intelligeret eam non esse in materia, ut Plato posuit. Non
est autem verum quod proponitur, si ly aliter accipiatur ex parte intelligentis. Est enim
absque falsitate ut alius sit modus intelligentis in intelligendo, quam modus rei in exis-
tendo, quia intellectum est in intelligente immaterialiter, per modum intellectus; non
autem materialiter, per modum rei materialis.’ Summa
eologiae I, q. 85 a. 1 ad 1.

5 The following summary of Peter of Spain’s semantics partly derives from Klima
2003, 526–31.

6 Peter of Spain 1972, 79: ‘Significatio termini, prout hic sumitur, est rei per vocem
secundum placitum representatio. Quare cum omnis res aut sit universalis aut par-
ticularis, oportet dictiones non significantes universale vel particulare non significare
aliquid. Et sic non erunt termini prout hic sumitur ‘terminus’; ut sunt signa univer-
salia et particularia.’

7 Peter of Spain 1972, 80: ‘Quare proprie non est significatio substantive vel adiec-
tiva, sed aliquid significatur substantive vel adiective quia adiectivatio vel substantiva-
tio sunt modi rerum que significantur, et non significationis.’

Page 264

indexes 245

unity
accidental 174, 184
universal
universal(s) 7, 29–37, 49–51, 67,

75–91, 111, 114–126
whole(s) (see whole)
utterances 30–31, 105, 114

vis (see power)

whole(s) 136, 161–189 (see also
mereology, part)
categorematic vs. syncategorematic

sense of 166
integral 165–171, 178, 183–185
kinds of 165, 167

Index of Names

Adam Wodeham 113, 153–154
al-Fārābī 37, 45n, 50, 69, 98n, 182n,

218n
al-Jūzjānī 49
Agricola (see Rudolph Agricola)
Albert of Saxony 10n, 166n
Albert the Great 32n, 97
Alexander of Aphrodisias 30, 76, 89
Ammonius 45n, 58n, 81, 150, 219, 221
Anastasius of Sinai 89
Andronicus 55n, 56–60
Anonymus Matritensis 103
Anonymus, Ars sophistica (second half

of 13th century), MS Prague MK,
M.80 100

Anselm of Canterbury 76–78, 89–90,
182n

Aquinas (see Thomas Aquinas)
Aristotle 1–2, 29–30, 36n, 37, 39, 41,

46–48, 50n, 54–76, 83, 87–91, 93,
96–106, 128–129, 133, 140–141,
149–154, 158, 161, 164, 170, 173–175,
183, 191–193, 198–201, 207–228

Arnulf of Provence 98n
Ashworth, E.J. 194–195
Aulus Gellius 136
Averroes 49n, 53–74, 151–152, 158
Avicenna 27–51, 97, 158, 181, 183,

195

Bacon (see Roger Bacon)
Billingham (see Richard Billingham)
Bocheński, I.M. 195
Boehner, P. 4–6, 14, 193–194
Boethius 75–78, 88–90, 95–97, 99, 104,

129, 144, 150–151, 164, 168, 178, 181,
207–228

Boethius of Dacia 99, 101, 105

Christophorus (Cristoferus) de Holmis
107n

Church, A. 194–195
Cicero 97n, 129, 144

Corcoran, J. 10
Cyril of Alexandria 82

Dawson, H. 127
De Libera, A. 203
De Rijk, L.M. 13
De Soto (see Domingo de Soto)
Diogenes Laertius 58n
Domingo de Soto 128, 131, 134–142
Dominicus Gundissalinus 37n
Dutilh Novaes, C. 12–14, 16, 159n,

191, 193–194

Euclid 191

Ferrybridge (see Richard Ferrybridge)
Forbes, G. 157
Frege, G. 7, 17n, 208, 211–212, 218, 228

Gadamer, H. 157
Garlandus Compotista 226
George of Brussels 132
Giles of Rome 96n
Goodman, N. 162

Henry Totting of Oyta 153n, 154n
Henry, D.P. 6

Ibn al-Ṭayyib 45
Ibn Rushd (see Averroes)
Ibn Sīnā (see Avicenna)
Ibn Suwār 45, 50n
Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn 39

Jardine, L. 127
John Maxentius 78
John Buridan 109, 121–126, 151–152,

155, 158–160, 166n, 170n, 183
John Duns Scotus 156, 174
John of Dacia 95n, 97
John of Damascus 83, 87–88
John Scottus Eriugena 78
Juan Celaya 132

Page 265

246 indexes

Quine, W.V.O. 126

Radulphus Brito 94, 99, 104, 166n,
182

Ralph Strode 131, 141
Ramus (see Petrus Ramus)
Read, S. 10
Richard Billingham 132, 141
Richard Ferrybridge 132
Robert Kilwardby 102, 150–151, 158,

198, 199–202
Roger Bacon 95, 154
Rudolph Agricola 127, 129
Russell, B. 155, 219n

Severus of Antioch 82, 84
Simon of Faversham 95n, 98
Simons, P. 176–177
Simplicius 30, 45n, 55–57, 60
Skinner, Q. 9, 21
Smiley, T. 193–194
Spade, P.V. 1, 9–12, 23
Street, T. 195
Swiniarski, J. 7

�emistius 74n
�omas Aquinas 65, 70–71, 112–113,

152, 159, 169, 171, 183
Trentman, J. 7

Vasletus 77n
Victorinus (see Marius Victorinus)

Walter Burley 113, 116n
William of Ockham 1–15, 152, 158,

169, 172, 174, 183, 193
William of Sherwood 99
Wodeham (see Adam Wodeham)

Xenocrates 58n

Zeno 55n, 58–61, 72
Zupko, J. 159

Karger, E. 10–12
Kilwardby (see Robert Kilwardby)
King, P. 155

Lambert of Auxerre 95, 166n
Leontius of Byzantium 79n, 81, 84–87
Leontius of Jerusalem 84–85
Leśniewski, S. 6–7, 162
Loux, M. 10
Łukasiewicz, J. 192, 201

Marenbon, J. 22, 204–205
Marius Victorinus 98
Martin, C. 156–157
Mates, B. 159
Matthew of Orléans 100
Matthews, G. 6, 8–9
Moody, E. 4–5, 14, 196

Odo of Cambrai 76

Paul of Pergula 130–131, 142
Peter Abelard (Abaelard) 77, 113,

149–151, 154–155, 157–159, 168n,
170n, 179, 207–208, 221–228

Peter of Auvergne 103–104
Peter of Spain 100, 110, 113–126, 135,

140, 144, 168n
Petrus Fonseca 128, 142–145
Petrus Ramus 127
Philoponus 45, 82–88, 184n
Philoxenus of Mabbug 82
Pinzani, R. 154–155
Plantinga, A. 157
Plato 73n, 77–78, 91, 161
Porphyry 1, 29–30, 36, 75, 78, 91, 95,

97, 150, 171, 181, 215–216
Priest, G. 10
Priscian 213–214
Pseudo-Dionysius 81
Pseudo-Jocelyn of Soissons 168n, 171,

179
Pseudo-Richard of Campsall 111

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